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DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF CORONAVIRUS:  
TRUST, BLAME AND UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
This article explores the relationship between crises and democracy through a focus on the 
unfolding coronavirus pandemic. Its central argument is that to interpret the current pandemic 
purely in terms of its epidemiology and public health implications risks overlooking its 
potentially more significant socio-political consequences. This is because the challenges posed 
by the coronavirus crisis have themselves become overlaid or layered-upon a pre-existing set of 
concerns regarding the performance, efficiency and capacity of democratic political structures. 
The aim of this article is to try and understand and warn against what might be termed a rather 
odd form of cross-contamination whereby the cynicism, negativity and frustration concerning 
politicians, political processes and political institutions that existed before the coronavirus 
outbreak is allowed to direct, define and automatically devalue how democratic structures are 
subsequently judged in terms of how they responded to the challenge. As such, this article focuses 
on the link between the Coronavirus crisis and the democratic crisis; or, more precisely, the risk 
that the Coronavirus crisis may mutate into and fuel a broader crisis of democracy. 
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 Keeping democracy healthy during a pandemic has already proved problematic in many countries 
where politicians have seized upon the crisis in order to claim emergency powers and strengthen their 
position (Hungary, Israel, etc.). At the same time, the victorious claims of countries such as China and 
Singapore have raised potentially far-reaching questions about whether authoritarian regimes handle 
pandemics more effectively than democratic ones (see, for example, Kleinfeld, 2020). The fact that this 
is happening in a global context that already contained an autocratization alert (see V-DEM, 2020), 
concerns about democratic backsliding (see IDEA, 2019) and an increase in populist pressures (see 
Institute for Global Change, 2020) simply underlines this articles emphasis on the need to understand 
the link  or more specifically the interplay - between the new Covid-focused crisis and the pre-
existing democratic crisis (on the latter see Keane, 2020). Although this article is primarily focused 
upon the United Kingdom the themes, issues and challenges that it highlights have a far broader 
international and global relevance.  
 
The link between the Coronavirus and the crisis of democracy is explored and developed through a 
focus on three inter-related themes: trust, blame and understanding. The first section focuses on public 
trust in politics before the pandemic emerged and how the outbreak appears to have affected public 
attitudes. The interesting element of this discussion is the contrast it offers with the publics trust in 
scientists and experts and the implications this has in terms of culpability, credit and censure. This 
brings the discussion to a second focus on the issue of blame in the second section. The simple argument 
is that if previous pandemics offer insights into the post-crisis politics of Coronavirus it is likely that a 
serious of intense and multi-dimensional blame-games will rapidly emerge. The main focus of this 
section is upon the early emergence of potential blame-limitation strategies within the British 
governments approach. This focus on scapegoats, sacrificial lamps and self-preservation strategies 
flows into a third and final focus on tolerance and understanding. The aim being to acknowledge the 
realities of decision-making and governing under pressure in times of crisis and through this develop 
an argument concerning balance, empathy and proportionate scrutiny. The manner in which a large 
number of legislative select committees have already announced their intention to launch pandemic-
linked inquiries, not to mention demands for wider national and international in-depth reviews, 
underlines the contemporary relevance of this argument. Taken together, a focus on these three topics 
(trust, blame and understanding) provides a buckle or link through which the relationship(s) between 
the coronavirus crisis and crisis of democracy can be understood. 
 
 
Trust  
 
The aim of this section is to make three relatively straightforward arguments about levels of public trust 
in elected politicians. The first is that the Coronavirus crisis emerged at a time of fundamental concern 
about the global state of democracy; the second is that the limited data that is available suggests the 
existence of a common crisis-linked rallying around the flag effect; and (third) that this uplift in public 
confidence and trust may well prove to be short-lived. As a first-step to substantiating these arguments 
Table 1 provides a precis of the core findings of a number of authoritative and evidence-based reviews 
on the state of democracy that have each been published within the last six months. Taken together, the 
core conclusions suggest that the anxieties that have surrounded democracy for at least half a century 
have in recent years grown in scale, complexity and intensity. This is linked to the emergence of a clear 
populist signal, the growth of anti-political sentiment and  critically  the emergence of a clear trust 
gap between the governors and the governed.  
 
Table 1. The Global State of Democracy, 2020:  
Source Report Core Conclusion Distinctive Element 
Institute for 
Democracy 
and 
Electoral 
Assistance 
(IDEA) 
The Global 
State of 
Democracy, 
2019: 
Addressing the 
Ills, Reviving 
the Promise 
Democracy is ill and its promise 
needs revivalWhile the idea of 
democracy continues to mobilise 
people around the world, the practice 
of existing democracies has 
disappointed and disillusioned many 
citizens and democracy advocates 
x Rejection of the reverse third-
wave theory 
x Strong emphasis on democratic 
backsliding  
x Focus on citizens expectations re. 
democratic, social and economic 
performance.  
Varieties of 
Democracy 
(V-DEM) 
Democracy 
Report 2020 
Autocratization (i.e. the decline of 
democratic traits) accelerates in the 
world. For the first time since 2001, 
autocracies are in the majority (92 
countries, home to 54% of the worlds 
population[plus] the emergence of 
toxic polarization 
x The issuing of an autocratization 
alert. 
x A new record in the rate of 
democratic breakdowns 
x Decline in liberal democracy 
intensifies. 
Centre for 
the Future 
of 
Democracy 
Global 
Satisfaction 
with 
Democracy, 
2020 
In the West, growing political 
polarisation, economic frustration, 
and the rise of populist parties, have 
eroded the promise of democratic 
institutions. In developing 
democracies the euphoria of the 
transition years has faded. 
x Democracy is in a state of 
malaise. 
x 2019 represents the highest level 
of discontent on record. 
x Deterioration particularly stark in 
high-income consolidated 
democracies. 
Pew 
Research 
Centre 
Democratic 
rights popular 
globally but 
commitment to 
them not 
always strong, 
February 
2020. 
[D]emocracy remains a popular idea 
among average citizens, but 
commitment to democratic ideals is 
not always strong. And many are 
unhappy with how democracy is 
working. One important driver of 
dissatisfaction with democracy is 
frustration with political elites. 
x Distrust of elites is critical  
x Underwhelming percentages of 
the public describe democratic 
rights and institutions as very 
important. 
x Increase in dissatisfaction levels 
stark in the United Kingdom. 
Freedom 
House 
Freedom in the 
World 2020 
Democracy and pluralism are under 
assault. Dictators are toiling to stamp 
out domestic dissent [and]many 
freely elected leaders are increasingly 
willing to break down institutional 
safeguards and disregard the rights of 
critics and minorities as they pursue 
their populist agendas. 
x 2019 was the 14th consecutive 
year of decline in global freedom 
x Drift towards division and 
dysfunction  
x Global phenomenon in which 
freely elected leaders distance 
themselves from political norms. 
 
 
Within this democratically dubious context the UK held a particularly prominent position due to a 
combination of generalised and long-standing concerns regarding the nature and limits of a majoritarian 
power-hoarding democracy plus more specific and related concerns regarding the countrys relationship 
with the European Union. The Hansard Societys 16th Audit of Political Engagement (2019) provides a 
powerful evidence base for these arguments and its headline findings can be summarised as:  
 
x Opinions of the system of governing are at their lowest point in the 15-year Audit series  worse now 
than in the aftermath of the MPs expenses scandal. 
x People are pessimistic about the countrys problems and their possible solution, with sizable numbers 
willing to entertain radical political changes.  
x Core indicators of political engagement remain stable but, beneath the surface, the strongest feelings of 
powerlessness and disengagement are intensifying. 
 
It would at this point be possible to drill-down into each of these points through the provision of 
evidence-based insights such as: 72% of those surveyed said the system of governing needs quite a lot 
or a great deal of improvement; asked whether the problem is with the political system or the people 
running it the largest response group (38%) replied both; 50% of those surveyed believed the main 
parties and politicians didnt care about people like them; 75% thought political parties were too 
internally divided to serve the best interests of the country; 63% thought Britains system of government 
is rigged to advantage the rich and the powerful; the number who strongly disagree that political 
involvement can change the way the UK is run (18%) had hit a fifteen-year low; as had the 47% who 
felt they had no influence at all over national decision-making. If this was not bad enough the 2019 
survey also detected hints of what might be interpreted as an illiberal swing away from the core tenets 
of liberal democracy. When it came to the publics levels of confidence and trust in different 
professions, for example, the military/armed forces (74%) and judges/courts (62%) scored far higher 
than MPs (34%) or members of the government (33%). Added to this was the fact that only 25% of the 
public had confidence in MPs handling of Brexit (with the government faring only slightly better on 
26%). Of particular concern was that over half (54%) of those surveyed agreed with the statement that 
Britain needs a strong leader willing to break the rules, and 42% thought that many of the countrys 
problems could be dealt with more effectively if the government didnt have to worry so much about 
votes in Parliament.  
 
The Ipsos MORI Veracity Index  published just days before the 2019 General Election  found that 
public trust in politicians had fallen to just 14%, a five per cent fall from 2018.  Professors were, by 
contrast, highly ranked at 86% but government ministers lowly ranked at 17% which represented a level 
of distrust far greater than that even suggested by the Hansard Societys audit of political engagement 
but which did resonate with the broader data and evidence on the global state of democracy (see Table 
1, above). The gap, or more precisely chasm, between public trust in scientists/experts/professors, on 
the one hand, compared with politicians on the other, is striking and forms a central element of 
arguments offered later in this article. It is, however, worth noting at this early point that the Edelman 
Trust Barometers Trust and the Coronavirus report of 1 April 2020 that surveyed 10,000 people 
across ten countries found that: 85% of respondents agreed that we need to hear more from the 
scientists and less from politicians; 58% were concerned about the politicization of the crisis (Certain 
people are making the situation seem worse than it is for political gain); and that scientists were trusted 
to tell the truth by 83% of those surveyed, compared to 51% who trusted their prime minister or 
president. The aim of emphasising these statistics on (dis)trust is simply to underline that the health of 
democracy was not in good shape when the pandemic emerged and that populists had for some time 
been fuelling and funnelling public frustration in an attempt to gain power and legitimate the 
construction of strong leader illiberal democracies (i.e. what the Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance refer to as democratic backsliding). The obvious risk, and one that has already come into 
fruition in some countries, is that the pandemic will be used by populists to further dilute or remove 
democratic safeguards (what Daniel Levitsky and Daniel Zilatt refer to in their hopefully not prophetic 
2018 book How Democracies Die as the soft handrails that checks-and-balances provide) as part of 
the autocratization process that the Varieties of Democracy Project has warned against.  
 
The issue of public trust therefore provides the first strand in the link between the coronavirus crisis 
and crisis of democracy. But whats interesting in this regard is that the immediate impact of the 
pandemic appears to have been a sharp increase in the popularity of incumbent national leaders (see 
Jennings, 2020). Two elements stand out within this general trend: the first is that the Boris bounce 
was exceptional, rising to 52% by mid-March 2020 (up 16% from his ratings just before the December 
2019 General Election); the second is that the Trump jump fell fairly flat when compared with the 
spike in public support enjoyed by most leaders. Although approval ratings are very different to precise 
trust-based assessments they do point to the existence of a social phenomenon that political science has 
identified for some time and that is certainly related to questions of trust  the rallying around the flag 
effect. This concept was first coined by John Mueller in 1970 and relates to the observation that groups 
tend to unify in times of crisis and at the national level this is commonly exhibited through support for 
national leaders. The March 2020 Boris bounce is essentially the UKs equivalent of a rallying around 
the Union Jack effect but it is dissecting and understanding this change in social attitudes that more 
light can be spread on the emergent politics of Coronavirus and in this regard three issues deserve brief 
comment. 
 
The first two issues concern the two main and inter-related variables that are generally offered by 
scholars to explain this effect. The first of these emphasises the social psychological dimensions of a 
crisis and particularly the power of patriotism (for a discussion see Baker and Oneal, 2001). In times of 
crisis national leaders are, the theory suggests, viewed as almost the embodiment of national unity 
fighting the crisis for the public good, which is especially significant when the leader is both head of 
state and head of government as in the United States. The second theory, that has been explored in the 
work of Hetherington and Nelson (2003) amongst others, believes that the rallying effect occurs due to 
more institutional reasons and particularly due to the oppositions general reluctance to openly attack 
the government during a clear crisis. A reduction in attack politics by opposition parties leads to less 
conflict being reported in the media and so, this approach suggests, the public assumes the government 
must be performing better than normal. The public may not trust their political leaders but they might 
view them as competent in terms of governing capacity which leads to a third and final point about 
rallying around flags  it usually doesnt take long for fleeing the flag to occur. This is a critical point. 
Although most analyses of rallying around the flag effects are concerned with wars, invasions or 
terrorist effects with a clear enemy, rather than public health pandemics in which the enemy is a new 
strain of virus, the overall conclusion is that the rally effect is usually short-lived. The public are fickle 
and it may be just one or two months before public opinion returns to pre-crisis levels. In the UK there 
are already suggestions that the publics support for the governments approach and levels of trust in 
key ministers was by early April 2020 already waning (see Opinium, 2020).  
 
This fall in public support may well reflect the existence of major concerns about unpreparedness and 
indecision within the government which was underlined in the sudden shift from a focus on herd 
immunity and basic precautions (notably handwashing) to a policy of legally enforced social distancing 
and lockdown. From personal protective equipment to the repatriation of citizens, through to the 
availability of ventilators and questions concerning the polices use of lockdown powers, not to 
mention mix-ups, muddles and misunderstandings concerning virus-testing and care home policy, have 
combined to produce accusations that the governments response has been little short of a disaster 
(see Jenkins, 2020). This raises at least two issues that emerge out of this sections focus on trust and 
serve to refocus attention back on the link between the specific Covid crisis and broader crisis of 
democracy. The first revolves around the issue of blame and warns against the political system going 
MAD in the sense of falling victim of Multiple-Accountabilities Disorder (Koppell, 2005) and the 
scapegoating, scalp-hunting and sacrificial practices that usually come with it. The second (flip-side) 
issue underlines the need for public understanding in the sense of not only appreciating the realities of 
crisis management situations but also about the manner in which coronavirus is itself being politicised 
by different actors. The first of these themes is the focus of the next section.  
 
 
Blame 
 
Amongst the contemporary chaos there are three predictions that can be made with relative certainty.  
The first is that around a year from now there is going to be a baby boom which will reflect what those 
couples that have enjoyed spending time together have been up to. The second is that the baby boom is 
likely to be matched by a similarly spectacular increase in divorces (reflecting those couples that did 
not enjoy spending so much time together). The final confident prediction is that in just a matter of 
weeks or months the Covid crisis will lead to an outbreak of divisive and disruptive political blame 
games as politicians, policy-makers, advisers and experts all seek to avoid carrying the can for those 
decisions or opinions that inevitably turned-out to be wrong. It is in the context of this core prediction 
that this sub-section makes three arguments: (i) the analysis of previous pandemics exposes the 
existence of a powerful socio-political negativity bias; (ii) politicians will try and manage this 
situation through a mixture of blame-games and self-preservation strategies; and (iii) it is already 
possible to identify a dominant strategy in the UK context that for the sake of brevity can be labelled 
hugging the experts.  
 
When it comes to considering the link between public trust and blame even the most cursory review of 
the existing scholarship on how governments have attempted to cope with pandemics in the past reveals 
a body of work that is primarily framed around the notion of policy failure. This is a critical point. No 
matter what steps a government might take or how quickly measures are put in place the fact that by its 
very existence a pandemic brings with it crisis and chaos intermixed with death and suffering ensures 
that any governmental response will be seen in generally critical terms. The title of Greg Behrmans 
2009 book The Invisible People: How the U.S. has Slept Through the Global AIDS Pandemic, the 
Greatest Humanitarian Catastrophe of Our Time reflects this point. Although it could actually be seen 
as fairly successful in terms of protecting life, the political reaction to the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) pandemic at the beginning of the millennium is generally critiqued in terms of either 
over-reaction or under-reaction (see, for example, Hooker and Harr Aliis, 2009; Freedman, 2005). Add 
to this the manner in which What went wrong? seems to be the dominant lens through which responses 
to both Swine Flu and Ebola are judged and the link between pandemic control and blame attribution 
becomes clear (see Kamradt-Scott, 2018). But whats also interesting about this seam of scholarship on 
pandemic crisis management is the manner in which it is infused with discourses not only of political 
blame and counter-blame, but also with discussions of self-blame, notions of shame and an awareness 
of the cultural apportionment of blame to specific countries or communities that is generally not 
discussed within the fields of public administration, executive studies or mainstream public policy (see, 
for example, Nerlich and Koteyko, 2012; Abeysinghe and White, 2011). A link is, however, provided 
in the work of Cáceres and Otte in their work on blame apportioning and the emergence of zoonoses 
(i.e. diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans) during the last twenty-five years when 
they note:  
 
[B]lame games take place between infected and non-infected regions, as well as between developed and 
developing nations. Apportioning of blame, more commonly known as finger pointing, is an inherent 
feature of human beings. This blaming process can be either active or passive depending on the issue(s) 
and given context(s). Evidently, blaming is used to shift responsibilities onto others, it singles out a 
culprit, finds a scapegoat and pinpoints a target, regrettably however, apportioning blame comes at a cost 
to those that are blamed. Expanding our epidemiological understandings into the realms of blamers and 
blamed permits a more realistic, emphatic and conscientious look into the unintended consequences of 
individual and institutional actions, and the extent to which other countries or regions are detrimentally 
affected by misguided pre-conceptions (2009, pp.377-8).  
 This focus on the cost of blame and unintended consequences brings us to a second argument and 
the suggestion that politics of the coronavirus pandemic (in the UK and beyond) is already beginning 
to revolve around the issue of blame (blame-shifters, blame-shiftees, blame-boomerangs, etc.). In this 
regard, political science offers a rich seam of scholarship on blame avoidance behaviour that arguably 
dates back to at least Machiavelli but has more recently been developed in the work of scholars 
including R. Kent Weaver (1986) and Christopher Hood (2013). Synthesised and simplified down to 
its core elements, this body of work reveals how politicians are primarily motivated by avoiding blame 
for failure rather than trying to claim credit for success for the simple reason that the public possess a 
strong negativity bias. Praise will be as fickle as it is short-lived; whereas vitriol will be as strong as 
it will long-lived. The implication being that politicians will use all sorts of tricks and tactics  agenda-
shaping, scapegoating, buck-passing, defection and secrecy as part of a deeper Teflon immorality (see 
Smilansky, 2012) in order to keep themselves blame free. The relevance of this literature to the link 
between the coronavirus crisis and the broader crisis of democracy is the manner in which it connects 
the focus on public trust (discussed above) with the performative and substantive content of 
governmental policy responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Blame Game with Malign Outcomes and Sympathetic 
or Vindictive Public Attitudes 
 
Source. Hood. C. 2002. The Risk Game and the Blame Game, Government and Opposition, 37(1), 
15-37, at. p.22.   
  
 
In this regard the work of Christopher Hood on the risk game and the blame game (see Table 2, above) 
is particularly valuable for at least three reasons: first, it highlights the range of blame-avoidance 
strategies that politicians can utilise (notably presentational strategies, policy positions and the 
delegation of responsibility arms-length agencies); second, it contextualises the use of these strategies 
through an emphasis on public attitudes; and thirdly it highlights that blame-shifting can backfire if 
those to whom responsibility is directed push back (hence the emphasis on blame-reversion, 
boomerangs and lightning-rods). The key question then becomes how this framework contributes to our 
understanding of the unfolding politics of coronavirus?  
 
Working across a very wide and fluid empirical landscape and using a fairly broad analytical brush, the 
main answer to this question can be summarised as follows. First and foremost, (and as the previous 
section emphasised) public attitudes to politicians, political processes and political institutions were in 
fairly poor health in most advanced liberal democracies as the pandemic emerged. High levels of 
political frustration, apathy and anger were identified within large sections of the public and this had 
led to the emergence of potentially democratically dangerous level of anti-political sentiment. In 
contextual terms and with Table 2 in mind, public attitudes were arguably leaning more towards the 
vindictive than the sympathetic vis-à-vis Hoods schema and this matters because the literature on 
pandemics and disease control clearly shows that whether the public is willing to follow public advice 
is highly dependent on pre-existing levels of political trust, hence its common focus on crying wolf, 
meta-communication patterns, epidemic intelligence and vaccine hesitation (see Nerlich and 
Koteyko, 2012; Mesch and Schwirian, 2015). The lack of pre-existing public trust may well have 
significant implications in terms of preventing what has been variously labelled crisis fatigue or 
lockdown fatigue (Flinders, 2020) amongst the public and a reluctance to abide by social isolation 
advice. The fact that in the UK these risks exist in the context of well-documented Brexit fatigue 
underlines the manner in which the coronavirus crisis cannot be studied in isolation and should more 
accurately be conceived as being layered-upon or inter-woven with a complex patchwork of challenges.  
 A second way in which Hoods framework helps focus attention on the pandemic-democracy link, in 
general, and blame, in particular, is through the identification of specific blame-avoidance strategies. 
In the UK there has arguably been a very clear strategy at play which has revolved around the adoption 
of a technocratic, science-based and evidence-led approach that has ensured that no government 
statement has been made without the explicit caveat about following the advice of the experts. This 
hugging the experts is possibly even a future blame-avoidance tactic in preparation that represents an 
amalgam of presentational, policy and delegatory elements. The sight of Boris Johnson or other senior 
ministers flanked at the daily press conferences by the Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific 
Advisor is without doubt a strategic performative act of blame-sharing and blame-displacement. This 
is by no means unique to the UK.  In some countries a new public service bargain seems to have emerged 
whereby the politicians depart the stage to an almost total extent and let the experts become the public 
face of the crisis. Take, for example, Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases in the United States, Fernando Simón, the head of Health Emergency Centre in 
Spain, Christian Drosten, the head of virology at Charité hospital in Germany, Jérôme Salomon, head 
of the National Health Authority in France and Prof. Chris Whitty and Sir Patrick Vallance in the UK 
(the Chief Medical Adviser and Government Chief Scientific Adviser, respectively). As Jon Henley 
(2020) has illustrated, its the experts that are now the household names. Not only does this raise 
issues about the political selection of expert advice (discussed below) but it also raises questions about 
the political protections afforded to scientists who become drawn into major debates and may become 
blame-shiftees or sacrificial lambs when the scrutiny industry kicks-in.  
 
And kick-in it will. A third way in which the literature on blame games is relevant to the current 
coronavirus crisis is due to the manner in which it underlines the aggressive and adversarial nature of 
public accountability. This is encapsulated in the notion of the negativity bias and simply reflects that 
manner in which political decisions are generally taken in a low-trust, high-blame environment. Put 
slightly differently, public accountability is generally of the gotcha! variety (which is a particularly 
problematic paradigm when placed within the contours of Hilliard, Kovras and Loizides (2020) 
scholarship on the perils of accountability after crisis). The aim is very rarely to undertake a reasoned, 
balanced or proportionate review of what happened in order to learn lessons but primarily to apportion 
blame and demand some form of sacrificial responsibility. This is particularly true in power-hoarding 
majoritarian democracies like the UK and especially due to the focusing impact of the convention 
individual ministerial responsibility to parliament. Any attempt by ministers to deflect blame therefore 
risks bouncing-back on them in the form of a blame boomerang if the expert, scientist or publicly 
trusted professor refuses to be scapegoated. The fact that the dark clouds of intense public and 
parliamentary scrutiny are already visible and hanging over the coronavirus is symptomatic of the 
potentially pathological politics of accountability that this section is attempting to underline. The World 
Health Organisation declared the outbreak to be a pandemic on the 11 March 2020 and by the end of 
the second week of April 2020 fifteen parliamentary committees had already announced inquiries (some 
multiple inquiries) into various elements of the governments response (see Table 3, below). 
 
Table 3. In Crisis House of Commons Committees of Inquiry 
 
TOPIC COMMITTEE CLOSING DATE 
FOR EVIDENCE 
Coronavirus: Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office Response 
Foreign Affairs Committee [Report published 6 
April 2020] 
Management of the Coronavirus outbreak Health and Social Care Committee n/a 
Quality of the Coronavirus Act and 
associated legislation and its effectiveness 
Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs* 
n/a 
Economic Impact of Coronavirus Treasury Committee 31/3/2020 
Impact of Covid-19 on the Charity sector Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee 
16/4/2020 
The Dept. for Work and Pensions response to 
the Coronavirus outbreak 
Work and Pensions Committee 16/4/2020 
Home Office preparedness for Covid-19 
(Coronavirus) 
Home Affairs Committee 21/4/2020 
The COVID-19 pandemic and international 
trade 
International Trade Committee 24/4/2020 
The impact of coronavirus on businesses and 
workers  
Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Committee 
30/4/2020 
Unequal impact: Coronavirus (Covid-19) and 
the impact on people with protected 
characteristics - 
Women & Equalities Committee 30/4/2020 
Covid-19 and food supply Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee  
1/5/2020 
Impact of Covid-19 on DCMS Sectors Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee 
1/5/2020 
Humanitarian Crises Monitoring: Impact of 
Coronavirus 
International Development  8/5/2020 
The impact of COVID-19 on education and 
childrens services 
Education Committee 31/5/2020 
The Governments response to COVID-19: 
human rights implications 
Joint Human Rights Committee  22/7/2020 
UK Science, Research and Technology 
Capability and Influence in Global Disease 
Outbreaks 
Science and Technology Committee  31/7/2020 
Notes:  1. List correct as of 15 April 2020. 
2. * PACAC has announced its intention to call ministers to account on the topic but it has not 
launched a formal inquiry (yet).  
 
 
 
The number or range of select committee inquiries  or, for that matter, any forms of public 
accountability process  is not the issue. The point being made relates to the nature and ambitions of 
those scrutiny processes and whether they themselves become part of the problem with democracy, due 
to a focus on scalp-hunting and shallow adversarialism that is devoid from any appreciation of the 
realities of crisis management, or part of the solution, in terms of promoting a balanced assessment of 
what went wrong, why and how similar patterns might be avoided in the future. In essence this is the 
argument relating to understanding that forms the focus of the next and final section but before engaging 
with this argument it is necessary to conclude this section with a very discussion of three final blame-
related insights.  
 
The first is that it is likely that the coronavirus crisis will serve to redefine the scholarship on blame-
shifting just as it is likely to alter the contours of the debate concerning democracy. The complexity and 
intricacies of crisis-responses will somehow have to be accommodated within models that have 
generally been constructed around and within the notion of national systems. And yet we can already 
see the emergence of global blame games wherein specific and primarily American politicians and 
organisations are attempting to blame China for the crisis (see Henderson et al., 2020); while China 
seeks to pass the buck back to the United States in what has become a war of words amidst Covid-19 
(see The Straits Times, 13 March 2020). Donald Trump is widely interpreted as trying to scapegoat the 
World Health Organisation by withdrawing American funding. European blame games are also 
beginning as, for example, Italy blames the European Union for being too slow to help member states 
(see Boffey, 2020). Within the UK cracks and pressure-points are already beginning to appear as 
tensions grow between departments, ministers, officials, agencies and advisers as the prospect of public 
scrutiny become ever more immediate. This brings us to a second issue and the blame attraction or 
buck stops here qualities (see Table 2, above) that come with being a minister. Despite the cross-
governmental nature of the challenge, in strict constitutional terms it is the Secretary of State for Health 
and the Prime Minister who are likely to emerge as the lightning rods when it comes to the allocation 
of blame and as key targets when it comes to demands for a sacrificial lamb to carry-the-can. And yet 
even here the curiosities of coronavirus may well defeat conventional understandings.  
 
 
On the one hand, the emergence of the Health Secretary from virus enforced self-isolation on the 2nd 
April to announce that mistakes had been made and that a U-turn on testing policy was needed that 
would see capacity increased to 100,000 tests a day by the end of April was a clear attempt to bolster 
public confidence by taking very clear personal responsibility for the target; on the other hand, the 
announcement that the Prime Minister had been taken to hospital and then moved into intensive care 
potentially insulates him from some element of blame, and may well fuel a second rallying around the 
flag effect for the government as the media and opposition parties soften their stance. Although there 
is evidence to support this claim it might be more accurate to identify the existence of a post-
hospitalisation surge in support for the Prime Minister rather than the government. Boris Johnson was 
discharged from hospital on the 12 April 2020 and a YouGov approval rating poll conducted at the time 
found a staggering leap in the proportion of the public who thought he was doing very well as Prime 
Minister (30%, up from 14% in mid-March), with 36% suggesting he was doing fairly well (up from 
32%). Boriss Teflon-coated qualities and blame-avoidance behaviour have been discussed throughout 
his political career and he has been known to adopt cunning exit strategies in the past when faced with 
tricky situations. Nevertheless, the notion of medical distancing as a blame avoidance strategy would 
be extreme even for this most unconventional politician and Boris appears to be more popular than ever, 
possibly to the despair of his opponents.    
 
 
That said, the core argument of this section remains true: the coronavirus crisis is likely to spark a 
veritable tsunami of complex and aggressive blame games. This creates a strong risk that the structures 
of democratic governance will themselves fall victim to the painful politico-administrative malady that 
is generally labelled going MAD (i.e. Koppells (2005) multiple accountabilities disorder). This 
occurs when politicians and their officials are expected to account through so many different 
accountability channels and to so many scrutiny bodies  which themselves often demand very different 
forms of information and are blame-orientated rather than understanding-focused  that they are 
distracted from focusing on their core tasks. Put slightly differently, MAD occurs when senior staff are 
expected to spend too much time accounting-up instead of focusing on delivering-down which, in 
turn, increases the chances that mistakes and errors will be made which would, in turn, simply increase 
the scrutiny placed upon them. The potential pathologies of highly politicized accountability, as 
Matthew Flinders (2011) has demonstrated, means that  too much accountability can be as problematic 
as too little. This leads the discussion to a possibly unexpected focus on understanding as the final 
strand that connects the coronavirus crisis to the crisis of democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding  
 
Democratic politics, as Bernard Crick sought to explain in his Defence of Politics (1962), is a rather 
rough and ready affair. It grates and it grinds, it frequently cumbersome and generally clunky, it can be 
inefficient and its basis on the art of compromise can make it difficult to understand for those that are 
not intricately connected with those processes. It is messy.  And yet those characteristics are from 
Cricks perspective not failings but elements of the very beauty of politics; they reflect the simple 
manner in which politics is charged with somehow generating broadly acceptable decisions and choices 
in an environment that is increasingly defined by complexity and incompatibility. It would, of course, 
be possible to make politics smoother and more efficient, to impose clarity and clearer control 
mechanisms through a uniformity of style and structure. But the cost of such measures would in all 
likelihood be a decline in the sensitivity of that system to the rights and views of the individuals and 
communities within it. This matters because at the heart of any understanding of the link between the 
coronavirus and the crisis of democracy there has to be a fundamental understanding of the existence 
of inevitable trade-offs and dilemmas. The existence of these dilemmas are generally far more apparent 
in times of crisis due to the emphasis that is generally placed on the responsive capacity of the state 
rather than on the democratic sensitivity of the system. Tough decisions will have to be taken quickly, 
on the basis of imperfect information and without the possibility of extensive consultation and 
compromise in what might be seen as a capacity/democracy trade-off. Understanding the rationale, 
logic and implications of this shift is critical not just in terms of how it flows through to influence public 
trust, or how it structures subsequent blame-games but also due to the manner in which it shapes the 
ideational space  the simple realm of ideas  about how assessments regarding the future of democracy 
should be made.  
 
In order to understand this focus on understanding and demonstrate its centrality to this articles central 
focus on the nexus between the current Covid-19 crisis and broader debates concerning the crisis of 
democracy this section adopts a multi-levelled approach. This takes us from a micro-level 
understanding of politicians as individuals operating in a crisis context; through to a mid-range 
governmental focus on understanding and gauging policy success as well as policy failure; to a final 
macro-political focus on the grand narratives and regime battles that coronavirus appears to have 
unleashed. Taken together, what this three-level focus on understanding provides is a fresh and timely 
analysis of how two very different crises have come to be inter-woven with the risk that one (i.e. Covid) 
will be politicised and utilised in order to inflame the second (i.e. democracy). Defending democracy -  
or more specifically promoting an understanding of its inner beauty, inescapable inadequacies and the 
inevitable trade-offs that come with any choice of organising society  has therefore been the underlying 
ambition of this article. This is a point that brings us to begin by reflecting on the scale of the challenge; 
not in relation to defending democracy but more specifically in relation to the challenges posed by 
coronavirus. This is a new virus, it can be highly aggressive and it is easily transmitted. With this in 
mind it is possible to move across the three levels from the individual, to the system, to the basic notion 
of democracy.  
 
Any defence of democratic politics must to some extent seek to defend politicians. Although frequently 
demonised, derided and dismissed as self-serving and self-interested characters the simple fact is that 
politicians are at the end of the day humans, as the manner in which several leading politicians have 
succumbed to coronavirus reflects. Notwithstanding clear concerns about patterns of political 
recruitment and the degree to which the political class reflect the diversity to be found within society 
this does not alter the basic point that promotes some understanding of the practical and day-to-day 
pressures under which politicians generally operate. Put slightly differently, governing under pressure 
is incredibly demanding and an evidence-based debate about the mental health and well-being of 
politicians was already emerging before the coronavirus crisis emerged (for a review see Flinders et al. 
2020). These pressures increase as individuals assume the responsibilities of ministerial office and are 
particularly pronounced in times of crisis, especially when the source of the crisis is new and therefore 
no clear knowledge of what works is available. Crisis situations by their very nature demand that 
someone ultimately has to assume control and make decisions under extreme pressure, on the basis of 
imperfect information and in the full knowledge that they are dealing with matters of life and death 
for which they will at some point be held to account. In a democracy it is elected politicians to whom 
these decisions and situations fall. The public demands clarity (When will lock-down end?, When 
will a vaccine be found?, What is going to happen next?) when politicians are themselves charged 
with grappling with uncertainty and cannot produce simple answers to complex questions. This may 
explain their strategy of hugging the experts but as expert opinion itself divides and becomes more 
contested then so the ability of politicians to look to science for answers, at least in the short-term begins 
to wane.  
 
The micro-level argument is therefore simply one that promotes some understanding of the professional 
challenges and personal pressures that those who have at least dared to step into the arena and assume 
the burdens of office are attempting to manage. It would at this point be possible to explore the 
contemporary relevance of Theodore Roosevelts Its not the critic who counts speech of April 1910 
but such temptations must be resisted in order to move to a second mid-level focus on understanding 
institutional change. The simple argument here is that although, as the second section (above) 
suggested, the response of democratic governments around the world is likely to be seen through 
interpretations of policy failure  and some mistakes and failures will undoubtedly have occurred  it 
is also important to understand the scale of what has actually been achieved. In the UK the Whitehall 
machine and wider-state structures have demonstrated an ambition and agility that although not perfect 
cannot be denied. The scale of the achievements are worthy of reflection, irrespective of whether it 
relates to building new hospitals, launching new policies, negotiating new powers, liaising with other 
governments, co-ordinating a vast network of organisations and suppliers, calming and informing the 
public, reshaping the economy or building new financial safety nets. Interestingly, it is possible to 
identify a strong negativity bias within academe as well as within society more broadly. To enter the 
fields of public administration and public policy is generally a fairly depressing due to the almost 
obsessional focus of these fields on failures, catastrophes and disasters. The publication in April 2019 
manifesto Towards Positive Public Administration by Scott Douglas, Paul tHart and a large group of 
leading scholars was an explicit attempt to rebalance the analytical scales and promote an understanding 
of structural successes, policy achievements and democratic innovations. 
 
The mid-level argument is therefore one that seeks to promote some understanding of the structural and 
institutional accomplishments that have been achieved in the content of a truly exceptional and 
potentially transformative crisis. Democratic politics has not been able to make all sad hearts glad as 
Crick admitted it never could in his Defence over half a century ago and to some extent the Covid-crisis 
has shown this, but at the same time its achievements in response to the public health pandemic should 
not be too easily dismissed.  
 
This argument matters because it underpins a far broader macro-political dispute about the global state 
of democracy and how the coronavirus is already reshaping the debate about regime legitimacy and 
state capacity. The danger of the credit-claiming behaviour of China in containing the crisis through 
technologically powered surveillance is that it may engender an authoritarian appeal or strong leader 
effect that was to some extent already evident in many countries through the drift towards populism 
(see Table 1, above). The new coronavirus pandemic is not only wreaking destruction on public health 
and the global economy but disrupting democracy and governance worldwide Frances Brown (2020) 
and her colleagues have argued It has hit at a time when democracy was already under threat in many 
places, and it risks exacerbating democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. The 
geopolitical consequences of this can already be seen in the power grab behaviour of some national 
leaders and also in the attempts by international actors to defend democracy. The existence of what Dan 
Keleman (2020) has labelled an authoritarian equilibrium within the European Union has raised 
particular concerns. The decision of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to publish an open 
letter to the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, on the 24 March 2020 regarding the use of Covid-
emergency measures, plus the decision to launch a new EU Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy the very next day that is explicitly designed to defend human rights and democracy all 
over the world by using all our resources faster and more effectively, captures the sense that a new 
phase in the long-running tension between authoritarian and democratic regimes may well have started. 
 
Understanding the dynamic and dialectical relationship between concerns regarding the crisis of 
democracy and the unfolding coronavirus pandemic is necessary in order to prevent a form of socio-
political cross-cross-contamination whereby the cynicism, negativity and frustration concerning 
politicians, political processes and political institutions that existed before the coronavirus outbreak is 
allowed to direct, define and automatically devalue how democratic structures are subsequently judged 
in terms of how they responded to the challenge. Without appreciating (i) the fragility and significance 
of public trust, (ii) the potentially pathological impacts of blame-games, or (iii) understanding the 
achievements of individuals and institutions working together to address a collective threat there is a 
very real risk that the coronavirus crisis will fuel a broader crisis of democracy. 
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